Analysis of Mathieu Simplice Sarandji's Prime Ministership: Survival Without Reform

Faustin Zaméto published an analysis on September 17, 2026, examining Mathieu Simplice Sarandji's three years as Prime Minister, a period he characterized as focused on state survival rather than reform. This in-depth analysis by Faustin Zaméto, published as a tribune, meticulously dissects the challenges and achievements of Sarandji's tenure at the Primature. Sarandji was appointed Prime Minister in April 2016 when, according to Zaméto, "il n’y a plus d’État" (there is no longer a state). Zaméto stated that Sarandji's primary mission was not to develop but "de faire survivre" (to make survive). He noted that Sarandji succeeded in the first phase, confirming that "l’État a survécu" (the state survived). However, the analysis indicated that "la seconde phase," which involved "refondation par les institutions" (refoundation through institutions), was not initiated during his tenure. Zaméto's tribune, published on September 17, 2026, thus offers a critical retrospective on a key period in the Central African Republic's recent history, noting a key distinction between immediate crisis management and long-term institutional building.

The State on the Brink

Faustin Zaméto distinguished two periods within Mathieu Simplice Sarandji's tenure: the management of the post-crisis emergency and the subsequent absence of profound institutional transformation. According to Zaméto, the mission of Sarandji's government was explicitly 'to survive,' not 'to develop,' a critical distinction that shaped the priorities and outcomes of his premiership. In 2016, the Central African state was described as "at the edge of the void," characterized by empty public coffers, an absent territorial administration, and territory largely escaping administrative control. The appointment of Sarandji, a close confidant, former university colleague, and campaign director to President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, showed the urgency of the situation and the trust placed in him to navigate this immediate crisis. The initial phase of his leadership was entirely dedicated to stabilizing a state teetering on the brink of complete collapse, a monumental task given the systemic deficiencies and widespread insecurity.

A principal achievement of the Sarandji Primature was the Brussels conference in November 2016. This international gathering served as a key platform for the Central African Republic to present its National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding (RCPCA) to the global community. At this key conference, international partners committed over 2 billion dollars, a substantial sum that signaled renewed confidence and support for the beleaguered nation. These commitments led to the return of vital international organizations such as the European Union, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank, whose presence and financial backing were instrumental in resuscitating public services. Critically, these funds enabled the resumption of salary payments for civil servants, a fundamental step towards restoring state functionality and public trust. This episode was described by Zaméto as "the founding act that prevents final collapse," emphasizing its indispensable role in averting a total breakdown of governance and social order. The successful securing of these funds and the subsequent re-engagement of international partners provided a much-needed lifeline, allowing the state to regain a minimal operational capacity.

Following the initial stabilization efforts, tangible signs of institutional recovery began to emerge. These included the return of some prefects to their posts, a critical step in re-establishing administrative presence outside the capital. The reopening of the university symbolized a return to normalcy and the revitalization of educational institutions, offering hope for future generations. The resumption of parliamentary life indicated a tentative re-establishment of democratic processes and legislative oversight. From 2018 onwards, new security cooperation initiatives enabled a progressive reconquest of territory, gradually extending state authority into areas previously controlled by armed groups. These developments, though modest, collectively demonstrated that the state had indeed survived its immediate existential threat, fulfilling the primary objective set for Mathieu Simplice Sarandji's government. Zaméto succinctly summarized this initial period, stating, "For this first mission – to survive – the Primature did its job." This acknowledgment shows the effectiveness of Sarandji's leadership in the dire circumstances of 2016, successfully steering the nation away from the precipice.

Institutional Stagnation and Rent Management

Despite the initial successes in state survival, the government's inability to transition from a phase of state survival to one of profound institutional refoundation is identified as a critical "missing link" in Mathieu Simplice Sarandji's premiership. This inability marked a significant shift from crisis management to a period of institutional stagnation. During this period, an imbalance existed, characterized by what Faustin Zaméto described as "A weak Primature, a strong Presidency." This structural imbalance had direct implications for governance and decision-making. The Prime Minister's limited personal political base reportedly constrained his capacity for arbitration, meaning that ministers frequently bypassed the Primature to engage directly with the Presidency. This dynamic further weakened the Prime Minister's authority and hindered the coherent implementation of government policies, contributing to a lack of coordinated institutional reform.

The international funding secured following the Brussels conference, while key for survival, inadvertently fostered a "rent management" approach. This logic manifested in the frequent utilization of exceptional procedures, such as negotiated contracts and direct agreements, to expedite spending. While these mechanisms might have been justified in the immediate aftermath of the crisis to ensure rapid deployment of resources, Zaméto noted that when an emergency persists for three years, "the exception becomes an administrative culture." This observation notes how temporary measures, born out of necessity, morphed into standard operating procedures, embedding a culture of circumvention rather than strengthening strong public procurement systems. This situation is attributed not to individual fault but to the systemic logic of a rentier state lacking effective technical counter-powers, where the influx of external funds can inadvertently perpetuate weak institutional frameworks rather than reforming them.

Parliamentary oversight during this time was notably limited. Although the Ministry of Finance, under Henri-Marie Dondra, ensured budget execution, control mechanisms like the Court of Auditors and market regulation bodies were still in the process of being re-established or were not yet fully functional. This meant that while funds were being spent, the strong checks and balances necessary for accountability and transparency were largely absent or nascent. The Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation (DDRR) process, a cornerstone of post-conflict recovery, did not achieve significant disarmament, leaving the underlying issues of armed groups unresolved. The Central African Republic would have greatly benefited from strengthened institutions dedicated to financial control, public procurement, and territorial administration during this critical phase. Key institutional deficiencies included the absence of a strong Court of Auditors, which is essential for auditing public accounts and ensuring financial integrity, an autonomous public procurement authority to oversee transparent contracting, and a genuinely funded decentralized administration capable of extending state services and authority effectively across the territory. The second phase, that of 'refoundation through institutions,' remained largely uninitiated.

A Persistent System

The government's signing of the Khartoum Agreement in February 2019, which integrated armed groups into the government, further illustrates the complex political compromises made during this period. This agreement is characterized by Zaméto as "a political compromise that buys time, but does not resolve the substance." While it offered a pathway to reduce immediate conflict, it did so by incorporating elements that could potentially undermine long-term institutional stability and accountability. The system established between 2016 and 2019, during Mathieu Simplice Sarandji's tenure, has proven remarkably resilient. It has persisted in 2026, outlasting Sarandji himself, indicating that the operational methods adopted during the crisis became deeply entrenched.

This enduring system is marked by four core characteristics that continue to define the Central African Republic's governance landscape. Firstly, it features strong centralization around the Presidency, concentrating power and decision-making at the highest level and often bypassing other state organs. Secondly, there is frequent recourse to exceptional procedures, perpetuating the "administrative culture" of bypassing standard rules for rapid action, even when the initial emergency has subsided. Thirdly, Parliament, while fulfilling its legislative duties by voting on laws, exercises limited control over their execution, diminishing its role as an oversight body. Finally, the prevailing peace relies more on political balances and agreements with armed groups than on full disarmament and the establishment of undisputed state authority, leaving the country vulnerable to renewed instability. The survival method, deemed necessary in 2016, became a brake after 2019, hindering genuine institutional development.

Faustin Zaméto summarized the initial period of Sarandji's premiership, stating, "For this first mission – to survive – the Primature did its job." This acknowledges the essential role played in preventing total collapse. However, the method of survival, deemed necessary in 2016, transitioned into a hindrance after 2019, actively impeding the necessary shift towards institutional strengthening. The challenge for the Central African Republic in 2026, as articulated by Zaméto, is to transition "from the state of survival, dependent on external rent and emergency, to the state of refoundation, based on institutions of control, accountability, and public services." This transition requires a fundamental shift in governance philosophy and practice. Eight years after the Brussels conference, which saw significant funds pledged and international commitments made, the tangible impact on the ground remains uneven. Citizens in areas such as PK5, Boy-Rabe, or Birao continue to perceive that the state's presence has not fully reached them, showing the persistent gap between international aid and local realities, and the urgent need for strong, accountable institutions to bridge this divide.